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Abstract
Any tax system imposing selective commodity taxation must have procedures for assign-
ing diﬀerent goods to tax rate categories. Real-world tax legislation does this on the basis
of observable characteristics, allowing the tax system to handle a constantly evolving set of
available goods. We recast the theory of optimal taxation in the language of characteristics
using the Gorman-Lancaster model of consumer behavior, and present a theory of tax-driven
product innovation and optimal line drawing. The paper consists of two parts. The first
part presents optimal tax rules showing that characteristics can be used to gauge optimal tax
rates in an intuitive way: the closer two goods are in characteristics space, the greater their
substitutability and the smaller the optimal tax rate diﬀerential. The second part starts
from the observation that, whenever the number of tax instruments is finite, tax systems
have to draw lines that define tax-rate regions in characteristics space. Such lines are as-
sociated with notches in tax liability as a function of characteristics, creating incentives to
introduce new goods (i.e., new characteristics combinations) in order to reduce tax liability.
New goods introduced this way are socially inferior to existing goods. Second-best optimal
tax systems draw lines so as to avoid such tax-driven product innovations; only goods on the
characteristics possibility frontier are allowed in the market. Hence, although the tax system
is second-best, the set of goods produced is first-best given the demand for characteristics.
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1 Introduction
According to the theory of second-best eﬃcient commodity taxation, the optimal tax rate on
any good depends on the Slutsky matrix of compensated demand derivatives with respect to the
prices of all goods. More generally, the optimal tax pattern may also depend on distributional
objectives and on the pattern of externality and internality generation across goods. In general,
optimal tax theory prescribes a diﬀerent tax on each good.
Whatever the reason for selective commodity taxation, a non-capricious tax system must
have procedures for distinguishing among goods subject to diﬀerent tax rates. Real-world tax
systems do that by appealing to the characteristics of the commodities. For example, American
states’ retail sales taxes often exempt food but not restaurant meals, requiring the tax law to
draw a line between the two categories. This is done by appealing to a set of characteristics of
a restaurant meal, and the line can be fine such as when grocery stores sell pre-prepared meals
that may or may not be eaten on the premises, or set up in-store salad bars. The retail sales
tax in the Canadian province of Ontario exempts basic food items such as flour but applies to
other processed foods such as chocolate bars, requiring lines to be drawn, including one that
subjects to tax “biscuits or wafers specifically packaged and marketed to compete with chocolate
bars.” Several European countries provide a subsidy for certain kinds of consumer services (e.g.,
cleaning, gardening, and house repair) based on a Ramsey-type justification that such services
compete with untaxed home production. This requires the classification of services eligible for
the subsidy based on observable characteristics.
The prominent role of characteristics in commodity tax systems is due to several factors.
First, using observable characteristics is a natural and intuitive way to distinguish among dif-
ferent goods, or diﬀerent groups of goods, and assign them to tax-rate categories. The al-
ternative that the theory implies–classifying goods according to compensated elasticities–is
infeasible, both because these elasticities are notoriously diﬃcult to estimate precisely and be-
cause they would not be intuitive to either policy makers, voters or consumers in the way that
characteristics-based rules are. Second, a shared characteristic plausibly signals something about
the relative substitutability of the goods, and so may serve as a more readily measurable indi-
cator of the ideal, but not observable, determinants of the appropriate tax rate. Third, modern
economies produce a vast amount of diﬀerent goods, and the set of available goods is constantly
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evolving. If tax laws were specified literally in terms of goods and their associated elasticities,
then there would be no natural way to assign a new good to a tax category and the law would
have to be re-specified to explicitly deal with the new good. In contrast, a characteristics-based
rule for assigning tax rates to goods naturally handles the creation of new goods by limiting the
tax policy choice to which characteristic-based category the new good falls in.
The first objective of this paper is to reformulate optimal commodity tax theory in the
language of characteristics so that it matches up more easily with real tax systems. To do so
we make use of the idea developed by Gorman (1980) and Lancaster (1966, 1975) that there
exists a mapping of each good into characteristics space, and that it is the characteristics of
goods, not the goods themselves, that generate utility.1 We formalize the relationship between
characteristics, substitutability and optimal tax rates, which allows us to explore the notion
that shared characteristics can be used to gauge substitutability and hence optimal tax rate
diﬀerentials. We show that the closer two goods are in characteristics space, the smaller the
optimal tax rate diﬀerential.
The second objective of the paper is to address an important aspect of reality that has been
ignored by the literature on optimal taxation, namely tax-driven product innovation. By this
term we refer to the creation of new products, i.e., new characteristics combinations, which are
introduced in the market in response to the tax system. For example, the prevalence of salad
bars and cafes inside supermarkets may be in part a response to the diﬀerential tax treatment
of restaurant meals and food purchased in grocery stores. In developing countries that impose
higher taxes on automobiles than on other types of vehicles, industries emerge that produce
low-tax vehicles that share many characteristics with cars. For example, the preferential tax
treatment of motorcycles in Indonesia led to the creation of a new type of motorcycle with three
wheels and long benches at the back seating up to eight passengers–car-like but not so car-like
as to be taxed as cars. When Chile imposed much higher taxes on cars than on panel trucks,
the market soon oﬀered a redesigned panel truck that featured glass windows instead of panels
and upholstered seats in the back.2
In the standard optimal tax model, addressing the creation of new goods is not tractable,
because a change in the set of available goods must be associated with a new utility function
1Although Gorman’s paper did not appear in a journal until 1980, it was originally written in 1956 and
therefore predates Lancaster’s work.
2These examples are taken from Harberger (1995).
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(with new arguments) and therefore a new optimal tax problem. In the Gorman-Lancaster
approach, on the other hand, because the set of characteristics that consumers value is stable,
the utility function is robust to the introduction of new goods and product innovation can then
be incorporated into the optimal tax problem.
In general, product innovation can come in two forms. It can either come as the introduction
of new characteristics combinations within an already feasible set of characteristics possibilities,
or it can come as the introduction of new characteristics combinations facilitated by expansions
of the characteristics possibility set. The second form reflects technological progress driven by
research and development, and may be labeled technology-driven product innovation. The first
form of product innovation, sometimes called product variation or product variety, does not
require a technological advance per se, and appears to be a ubiquitous and ongoing phenomenon
among profit-seeking producers in the modern-day marketplace.3 We focus on this form of
product innovation and study its relationship with the tax system. It is shown that non-uniform
taxation may give rise to the creation of goods that are socially inferior in characteristics space,
but which are privately optimal for tax avoidance purposes. This represents a distortion in
the set of available goods, which is diﬀerent from the demand and supply distortions typically
considered by public finance economists. The paper investigates the implications of this type of
distortion for the optimal design of a tax system.
Once we allow for the creation of new goods, it becomes clear that a tax system must
include procedures for assigning potential (but currently non-existing) goods to tax categories. In
principle, this calls for a separate tax rate associated with every possible point in characteristics
space, which corresponds to assuming an infinite number of tax rate instruments. If, as is
obviously reasonable, the number of instruments is restricted to be finite, a tax system has
to define subsets in characteristics space that correspond to tax-rate regions. This is entirely
consistent with much real-world tax legislation that defines tax categories by listing a number of
observable characteristics, and places any given commodity into the category with which it shares
a majority of its characteristics. This procedure is often labelled line drawing. Although line
drawing is a ubiquitous issue in real-world tax systems and a controversial point of contention
among tax lawyers, there is little economic analysis of the issue. Thus, a third objective of this
3 Indeed, Chamberlin (1953, p.3) stresses that “products are not in fact ‘given’; they are continuously changed–
improved, deteriorated, or just made diﬀerent–as an essential part of the market process.” Our paper pursues
the idea that one reason that products are “just made diﬀerent” is taxation.
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paper is to take a first step toward establishing a theory of optimal line drawing.
We emphasize in the paper that a “line” shares many attributes of a “notch” in tax schedules,
which refers to a discontinuity in the function of how tax liability relates to the tax base. Indeed,
a line creates a notch in characteristics space, because the tax liability changes discontinuously
when the characteristics vector of a good crosses the statutory line. Note that, as long as
a continuum of tax rates is administratively infeasible, notches in characteristic space are an
unavoidable feature of tax systems, not an idiosyncrasy.
We show that line drawing may lead to the introduction of new goods that are more intensive
in the high-tax characteristic than the original goods in the same tax region. By moving a good
towards the high-tax characteristic, but not crossing the line to the higher-tax region, consumers
are able to obtain more of the high-tax characteristic without incurring the additional tax liability
associated with the high-tax good. This form of product innovation may occur in two diﬀerent
regions in characteristics space. One is marginal product shifting around the existing goods,
whereby new goods that provide slightly more of the high-tax characteristic replace the original
goods. These are the supermarkets that provide some restaurant-like characteristics by setting
up in-store salad bars. New goods introduced in this way are only slightly socially inferior to
existing goods. The other is the introduction of new products exactly on the line that defines
the border to the higher-tax region. These are the car-like motorcycles in Indonesia and the
car-like panel trucks in Chile. Depending on the location of the line, such products may be very
socially inferior to existing goods, but privately optimal as they deliver a large tax reduction by
being located at the notch created by the line.
If the government can impose tax systems that includes any (finite) number of tax regions, it
is always possible to design a non-uniform tax system that completely avoids tax-driven product
innovation of socially inferior goods. We demonstrate that the second-best optimal tax system
completely avoids the introduction of socially inferior goods; only goods located on the frontier
of the no-tax characteristics possibility set are produced. The result can be seen as a form
of the production eﬃciency theorem (Diamond and Mirrlees, 1971), although the model and
reasoning is diﬀerent from the standard setting. Like the classic production eﬃciency theorem,
our result relies on strong assumptions regarding the commodity tax instruments possessed by
the government, and should therefore be seem as an idealized theoretical benchmark.
Two remarks are worth making about this result. First, it does not rule out that the optimal
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tax system aﬀects the set of goods in equilibrium, because the tax system will have substitution
eﬀects on the demand for characteristics, which may aﬀect the derived demand for goods and
lead to new goods being introduced or existing goods being eliminated. What the result implies
is that any new good that arises due to such eﬀects should be on a characteristics production
frontier, such that the set of available goods under the second-best optimal policy is first-best
eﬃcient, conditional on demand. Second, the result also does not rule out that new goods are
introduced as a result of technology-driven product innovations that allow previously infeasible
characteristics combinations to be produced. Indeed, if new characteristics combinations are
invented that expand the characteristics possibility set, our proposition implies that such char-
acteristics combinations should be allowed by the second-best optimal tax system. Because such
product innovations aﬀect the underlying technology of the economy, it changes the parameters
of the optimal tax problem and the tax system may have to undergo reform. But the new
optimal tax system would satisfy the characterization that we provide in this paper.4
As far as we are aware, none of the earlier literature addresses the salient features of real-world
tax systems that we explore: characteristics-based tax rules, tax-driven product innovation, and
line drawing in characteristics space. Although we address these issues in the context of a
Ramsey-style optimal consumption tax, we argue that they are a ubiquitous feature of all forms
of taxation. This includes income taxation where diﬀerent forms of income are treated diﬀerently,
requiring lines to be drawn based on the characteristics of diﬀerent income forms and where new
types of compensation may be introduced in order to facilitate tax avoidance.
Our paper contributes to the large literature on optimal commodity taxation (e.g., Diamond
and Mirrlees, 1971; Deaton, 1979, 1981; Christiansen, 1984; Saez, 2002, 2004), and proposes a
framework that has implications for optimal income taxation and the theory of tax avoidance and
evasion more generally.5 Within the standard optimal commodity tax model, Gordon (1989),
Weisbach (1999, 2000), Belan and Gauthier (2004, 2006), and Belan, Gauthier, and Laroque
(2008) have studied a question related to line drawing: how to group goods into a limited set
4This discussion implicitly views technological progress as exogenous to tax policy. It is conceivable that true
product innovations are endogenous to tax policy via eﬀects on the amount and type of R&D. An analysis of
optimal taxation under endogenous technical progress could in principle be incorporated into the framework we
set out in this paper, and is an interesting topic for future research.
5For recent surveys of the literature on optimal commodity and income taxation, we refer to Auerbach and
Hines (2002), Salanie (2003), Sørensen (2007), Kaplow (2008), Banks and Diamond (2008), and Crawford, Keen,
and Smith (2008). The literature on tax avoidance and evasion has been surveyed by, e.g., Slemrod and Yitzhaki
(2002) and Shaw, Slemrod, and Whiting (2008).
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of tax categories. This set of papers oﬀers rules for grouping goods based on compensated
demand elasticities and possibly distributional weights. Related, Yitzhaki (1979) and Wilson
(1989) analyze how to draw the line between a set of taxed and untaxed goods in a world where
uniform taxation is optimal but where expanding the tax base is associated with administrative
costs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out a characteristics approach
to optimal taxation, and characterizes the optimal tax system assuming that the set of available
goods is fixed. Section 3 allows for an endogenous set of available goods, and considers tax-driven
product innovation and line drawing. Section 4 concludes.
2 A Characteristics Approach to Optimal Taxation
2.1 A Gorman-Lancaster Model
In this section we develop a characteristics approach to optimal taxation based on the theory
of consumer behavior set out by Gorman (1980) and Lancaster (1966, 1975). The basic idea
in the Gorman-Lancaster model is that goods are associated with characteristics, and that it is
these characteristics that consumers value rather than the goods themselves. Any given good
may be associated with many characteristics, and any given characteristic may be obtainable
from several diﬀerent goods. If we denote the quantity consumed of characteristics by z0, ..., zM ,
utility can be specified as
u = u (z0, z1,..., zM) , (1)
where characteristics are generated from goods 0, ..., N according to a consumption technology
zk = ck0x0 + ck1x1 + ...+ ckNxN , k = 0, ...,M, (2)
where cki is the amount of characteristic k contained in one unit of good i.6
This specification of the consumption technology makes two key assumptions. First, there
is the assumption of linearity in characteristics generation. The basic idea is the following: if
what we care about in a car is its fuel eﬃciency and its size, and if one car is characterized by a
certain amount of fuel eﬃciency and a certain size, then a second identical car will have the same
fuel eﬃciency and size. As the example suggests, the assumption of a linear mapping of goods
6We do not have to restrict the coeﬃcients ck0, ..., ckN , nor the total amount of a characteristic zk, to be
positive. But we do assume that short sales of market goods are not possible, which implies xi ≥ 0, ∀i.
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into characteristics space relies on the notion that characteristics are intrinsic and objective, and
therefore reflect measurable features of a good that do not change with the amounts consumed
of the diﬀerent goods. Of course, there is still diminishing marginal returns to goods, but this
eﬀect operates solely through the utility function rather than through the mapping of goods in
characteristics space. In section 2.5, we consider a generalized Gorman-Lancaster setup featuring
nonlinear characteristics generation.
Second, there is joint production of characteristics because any given good xi may pro-
duce several (and possibly all) characteristics. This jointness of characteristics is central to the
Gorman-Lancaster approach and reflects the realistic idea that any single good will possess more
than one valued characteristic.7
The budget constraint of the consumer is given by
NX
i=0
pixi = 1, (3)
where p0, ...., pN denote the prices of goods to consumers and full income is normalized to be
equal to 1. Producer prices are fixed and given by q0, ..., qN such that the tax on good i equals
ti = pi − qi. We follow the convention in optimal tax theory by defining good 0 as leisure
and goods 1, ..., N as market goods, assume that leisure cannot be taxed (t0 = 0) and further
normalize so that q0 = p0 = 1.
Notice that our specification assumes that tax liability is triggered by the purchase of goods,
not the consumption of characteristics. The potential role of characteristics for taxation arises
because the government may decide to set the tax rate on a given good to be a function of
the characteristics of that good (and possibly all other goods). The optimal tax problem posed
below explores the nature of the optimal relationship between characteristics and tax rates. The
assumption that taxes apply to goods–but tax rates may depend on characteristics–is exactly
consistent with actual tax legislation as discussed at the outset of the paper.
7The Gorman-Lancaster model is often put in the same category as the Becker (1965) model, which has been
applied to optimal taxation by, e.g., Kleven (2000, 2004). However, besides the basic idea that market goods
are not carriers of utility in themselves but enter into the production of utility-yielding commodities, the two
models are fundamentally diﬀerent. The Becker model deals with household production assuming that joint
inputs (diﬀerent market goods and time) are combined to produce a single output (a household activity). The
Gorman-Lancaster model, on the other hand, considers the opposite situation where a single input (a market
good) generates joint outputs (a bundle of characteristics). In other words, while the Gorman-Lancaster model
considers a situation with fully joint production, the Becker model completely rules out joint production.
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We may summarize the model in vector notation as follows8
u = u (z) , z = Cx, px = 1, (4)
where C is the (M + 1) × (N + 1) matrix of all characteristics coeﬃcients. This matrix is
assumed to have full rank, which amounts to an assumption that no two goods or characteristics
(more precisely, linear combinations of goods or characteristics) are exactly identical.9 Notice
that, in the special case where C is diagonal, we may choose units so that C = I and the model
reduces to the standard model where u = u (x).
An important feature of a Gorman-Lancaster model is the number of characteristics versus
the number of goods i.e., the number of rows versus columns, in the consumption technology
matrix. Three cases need to be distinguished:
1. The number of goods equals the number of characteristics, N =M . In this case, C can be
inverted–there is a unique vector of goods associated with any given vector of characteris-
tics. This implies that the consumer’s problem can be formulated in two equivalent ways,
either a goods formulation (maximizing u (Cx) subject to px = 1) or a characteristics
formulation (maximizing u (z) subject to pC−1z = 1) where pC−1 is a vector of implicit
prices on characteristics.
2. The number of goods is lower than the number of characteristics, N < M . In this case,
C cannot be inverted, and it is no longer the case that any given characteristics vector
can be obtained by appropriately selecting goods. This implies that the characteristics
formulation of the consumer’s problem is not feasible, and we therefore have to work with
the goods formulation.
3. The number of goods is higher than the number of characteristics, N > M . Again, C
cannot be inverted, but now any given characteristics combination can be obtained from
more than one basket of goods. This implies that, at any given characteristics vector, the
consumer chooses goods so as to minimize expenditures associated with obtaining those
characteristics. With a linear consumption technology, expenditure minimization implies
8To simplify the notation, we do not specify if vectors/matrices are transposed or not.
9For example, if a column is linearly dependent on the other columns, this implies that one good is exactly
identical in characteristics to another good (or a combination of other goods), and hence one of the two goods
(whichever is more expensive) would never be purchased in equilibrium.
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that each consumer will purchase at most as many goods as there are characteristics.
Thus, with one representative consumer, the equilibrium cannot sustain more goods than
characteristics, and this case then reduces to a case with N∗ ≤M where N∗ is the number
of cost-eﬃcient goods associated with the M characteristics.
These remarks imply that, in a model with one representative consumer and a fixed set of
goods, we may focus on situations where N ≤ M as in cases 1 and 2. When the set of goods
is endogenized in Section 3, we allow for an unbounded number of potential goods (and hence
N > M as in case 3), and solve explicitly for the optimal set of goods in equilibrium.
In order to span all cases, we have to work with the goods formulation, i.e. u (Cx) and prices
p. In this formulation, the consumer’s first-order conditions can be written as
∇u ·C = λp or ∇u · ci = λpi, i = 0, ...,N, (5)
where∇u ≡ (u00, u01, ..., u0M) is the gradient of the utility function with respect to characteristics,
ci = (c0i, c1i, ..., cMi) is the ith column in C that reflects the characteristics provided by one unit
of good i, and λ is the shadow price associated with the budget constraint. We may eliminate
λ so as to emphasize the role of the marginal rates of substitution, which yields
MRSxij ≡
∇u · ci
∇u · cj =
pi
pj
, i, j = 0, 1, ..., n, (6)
where we write MRSxij with a superscript x to emphasize that this is a MRS between market
goods i and j, and not between characteristics. This MRS depends both on the properties of
preferences as represented by u (.) and on the mapping of x into z as captured by C.
2.2 A Distance Function Approach
The two standard approaches to solving optimal commodity tax problems are the utility func-
tion (primal) approach and the expenditure function (dual) approach. These approaches yield
optimal tax rules that, in general, depend on the entire Slutsky matrix of compensated demand
derivatives of all goods with respect to all prices. Such rules do not lend themselves easily to sim-
ple and operational statements about tax policy without making strong simplifying assumptions
about the structure of preferences. In order to understand the link between characteristics and
optimal taxation using the standard approaches, one must first characterize the relationship be-
tween characteristics and compensated demand elasticities and then investigate the implications
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for the optimal tax rates as a function of elasticities. This is a very indirect and complicated
way of analyzing the problem.
It turns out to be simpler to adopt a non-standard approach based on the distance function
introduced into consumer theory by Gorman (1970, 1976) and first applied to optimal tax
problems in two contributions by Deaton (1979, 1981).10 The distance function approach leads
to an optimal tax rule that depends, not on the entire substitution matrix, but only on the
substitutability of diﬀerent goods with leisure, where substitutability is defined in terms of
Antonelli coeﬃcients instead of Slutsky coeﬃcients.11 The Slutsky and Antonelli representations
of the optimal tax system are equivalent, but the latter makes more straightforward the link
between characteristics, substitutability, and optimal tax rates. In Section 2.4, we discuss the
connection between our results and standard optimal tax results.
We define the distance function a (u¯, z) = a (u¯,Cx) as the scalar by which the characteristics
vector z must be divided in order for the consumer to obtain an (arbitrary) utility level u¯. That
is, a (u¯,Cx) is implicitly defined by
u
³z
a
´
= u
µ
Cx
a
¶
= u¯, (7)
where a "better" basket is associated with a higher value of a. Clearly, if u¯ in (7) equals actual
utility u (Cx), then a = 1. We can then redefine the direct utility function u = u (Cx) in terms
of the distance function as
a (u,Cx) = 1. (8)
To find the derivative of the distance function with respect to xi, we total diﬀerentiate eq.
(7), which gives
∇u · ci
a
− ∇u · z
a2
· ∂a
∂xi
= 0. (9)
By evaluating (9) at the actual utility level (a = 1), and making use of the consumption tech-
nology (z = Cx), the first-order conditions (5), and the consumer budget (px = 1), this can be
rewritten as
ai (u,Cx) ≡
∂a (u,Cx)
∂xi
=
∇u · ci
λ
= pi. (10)
10The distance function is dual to the expenditure function, retaining its useful mathematical properties, but
defined on primal variables (quantities consumed) instead of dual variables (prices).
11As shown by Deaton, it is possible to derive Antonelli representations of the optimal tax system based on the
standard primal and dual approaches, but the distance function approach is much more direct.
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Equation (10) states that, at an equilibrium, the first-order derivative of the distance function
with respect to each good equals its price. Hence, the equation gives the price of each good as
a function of demand x and utility u, and (a0, ..., aN ) are therefore the inverse compensated
demand functions. From (10), we have
MRSxij (u,Cx) ≡
ai (u,Cx)
aj (u,Cx)
=
∇u · ci
∇u · cj =
pi
pj
, (11)
so that ai/aj measures MRSxij at a given utility level u, i.e. along an indiﬀerence surface.
Moreover, we have
aij (u,Cx) ≡
∂ai (u,Cx)
∂xj
=
∇2u · cicj
λ
, (12)
where ∇2u denotes the Hessian matrix of the utility function. The matrix of all the aijs is the
Antonelli matrix, which is the generalized inverse of the Slutsky matrix.
Following Deaton (1979, 1981) and Deaton and Muellbauer (1980), we define goods i and j as
complements if aij > 0, so that the marginal valuation of good i increases with the consumption
of good j along an indiﬀerence surface. Conversely, if aij < 0, we say that goods i and j are
substitutes. In the characterization of the optimal tax system, what will be particularly impor-
tant is the relative complementarity of diﬀerent goods with untaxed leisure (good 0). We say
that, if ai0ai −
aj0
aj
= ∂ log (ai/aj) /∂x0 is positive (negative), then good i is more complementary
(substitutable) with leisure than is good j. Notice that these definitions of complementarity and
substitutability based on Antonelli terms are not equivalent to those based on Slutsky terms.
2.3 Characteristics-Based Optimal Tax Rules
In this section, we express optimal tax rates directly as a function of Antonelli terms and
demonstrate how they depend on characteristics. In solving the optimal tax problem, we will
work with the distance function and use consumption levels (rather than tax rates) as control
variables. Of course, by setting tax rates, the government is eﬀectively controlling consumption
levels.
In the optimal tax problem, the government faces a revenue constraint given by
tx = R ⇔ (p− q)x = R. (13)
The government chooses x in order to maximize utility u (Cx) subject to the government budget
constraint, the first-order conditions from the consumer’s problem, and the zero tax on leisure.12
12Without this constraint, the optimal tax would be eﬀectively lump-sum.
11
Using the distance function representation (in particular, eqs (8) and (10)), the optimal tax
problem can then be stated as maximizing u with respect to x0, ..., xN , subject to
(i) a (u,Cx) = 1, (ii) (p− q)x = R, (iii) px = 1, (iv) ∇a = p, (14)
where ∇a = (a0, ..., aN ) is the gradient of the distance function with respect to x, and where
p0 = q0 = 1. By combining (ii)-(iii) and inserting p0 = q0 = 1, we may simplify the constraints
in (14) as
(i) a (u,Cx) = 1, (ii’ ) 1− x0 −
NX
i=1
qixi = R, (iv’ ) a0 (u,Cx) = 1. (15)
Condition (ii’ ) is a resource constraint for the economy. Condition (iv’ ) includes only the first-
order condition for good 0, because the conditions for goods 1, ..., N have become redundant as
consumer prices p1, ..., pN have been eliminated from the rest of the problem. The condition
in (iv’ ) implicitly defines x0 as a function of utility u and the demand for all other goods,
x1, ..., xN . We denote this function by x0 (x1, ..., xN , u) and insert it into (i) and (ii’ ), so that
the government is maximizing u with respect to (x1, ..., xN ) under (i)-(ii’ ) and the relationship
x0 (.). The Lagrangian associated with this problem can be formulated as
max
x1,...,xN
u− ρ [a (u,Cx)− 1] + μ
"
1− x0 (.)−
NX
i=1
qixi −R
#
, (16)
where x = (x0 (.) , x1..., xN ) includes the function x0 (.) as its first element.
The advantage of stating the optimal tax problem in this way is that it allows us to derive a
simple and explicit solution for optimal tax rates as a function of characteristics. We can show
the following:
Proposition 1 (Optimal Tax Rates) The optimal tax rate diﬀerential on any pair of goods
i and j is given by
tj
pj
− ti
pi
=
ρ+ μ
μa00
· ∂ log (ai/aj)
∂x0
=
ρ+ μ
μa00
·
∂ log
hPM
k=0 ωkj
cki
ckj
i
∂x0
, (17)
where ωkj ≡
u0kckj
∇u·cj and
PM
k=0 ωkj = 1.
Proof: In the appendix. ¤
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The first equality in eq. (17) does not exploit the structure imposed by the characteristics
approach, and therefore corresponds qualitatively to a form one can obtain in a standard model
without characteristics. It expresses the optimal tax rate diﬀerential between any pair of goods,
i and j, in terms of the log-change in the marginal rate of substitution between i and j along an
indiﬀerence surface as untaxed leisure varies. If good i is more complementary to leisure than
good j so that ∂ log (ai/aj) /∂x0 > 0, then good i should be subject to a higher tax rate than
good j.
The second equality in eq. (17) uses the characteristics structure to obtain a formula that
shows how the optimal tax rate diﬀerential between two goods depends on their characteris-
tics. To understand this expression, first note that the ω-parameters sum to 1 and therefore
reflect a weighting of relative characteristics ckickj over k = 0, ...,M . Hence, the optimal tax rule
expresses the tax rate diﬀerential between goods i and j in terms of the log-derivative (with
respect to leisure) of a weighted average of relative characteristics ckickj over k. Because the char-
acteristics coeﬃcients themselves are fixed, this log-derivative reflects simply a re-weighting of
relative characteristics. The impact of re-weighting relative characteristics is determined by the
variation in relative characteristics, which in turn captures the distance between two goods in
characteristics space. To see this, notice that being identical in characteristics does not require
that the characteristics vectors be identical (cki = ckj ∀k), but only that the two vectors are on
the same ray in characteristics space (cki = γ · ckj ∀k), in which case there is no variation in ckickj
over k.13 Hence, the closer are two goods in characteristics space, the less variable is ckickj across
characteristics k, in which case Proposition 1 tells us that the goods should be more equally
taxed.
In order to illuminate what it means for goods to be close to one another in characteristics
space, we next briefly consider a few specific cases. First of all, in the limit where goods i and
j become identical in characteristics, i.e. where ci = γ · cj , eq. (17) immediately implies that
there be no diﬀerentiation in taxation, so that:
Corollary 1 (Uniform Tax Rates) If a pair of goods, i and j, converge to one another in
characteristics space, i.e. ci → γ · cj, then tjpj −
ti
pi
→ 0.
To see more clearly the relationship between characteristics and optimal tax diﬀerentiation
13 In this case, the diﬀerence in characteristics is only a matter of diﬀerent units (buying one unit of good i
always gives the same characteristics as buying γ units of good j).
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outside of the limiting special case of identical characteristics, consider an ordering of charac-
teristics whereby ckickj is increasing in k. In this case, the more
cki
ckj
increases with k, the more
diﬀerent are the characteristics of two goods. The following proposition focuses on two special
cases:
Proposition 2 (Optimal Tax Rates) (i) Let ckickj = γ for k = 0, ..., h and
cki
ckj
= γ + ∆ for
k = h+1, ...,M , so that ∆ (relative to γ) is a measure of the distance in characteristics between
i and j. Then,
tj
pj
− ti
pi
∝
( PM
k=h+1
∂ωkj
∂x0
γ
∆ +
PM
k=h+1 ωkj
)
. (18)
(ii) Let ckickj = γ + δk for k = 0, ...,M , so that δ (relative to γ) is a measure of the distance in
characteristics between i and j. Then,
tj
pj
− ti
pi
∝
( PM
k=0
∂ωkj
∂x0 · k
γ
δ +
PM
k=0 ωkj · k
)
. (19)
In both (18) and (19), the denominator is positive, and therefore tjpj −
ti
pi
is non-decreasing in
absolute value in either measure of distance, ∆ or δ. Except when the numerator is exactly zero
(so that uniform taxation is optimal), tjpj −
ti
pi
is strictly increasing in absolute value in either ∆
or δ.
Proof: Follows by inserting the assumptions into (17) and rearranging. ¤
These propositions demonstrate the intuitive notion that, as two goods diverge in characteristics
space in an unambiguous way, the optimal tax rate diﬀerential increases in absolute value.
2.4 Connection to Standard Optimal Tax Rules
As an alternative to the Antonelli-based optimal tax rules presented above, it is possible to
characterize the optimal tax system in terms of the more familiar Slutsky terms as in the
standard Ramsey rule and its various specializations. Two points are worth noting about the
connection of our characteristics-based optimal tax rules to standard optimal tax results.
First, although the Gorman-Lancaster model is based on the idea that preferences depend
on characteristics rather than goods, it is possible to write utility as a function of the quantities
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consumed of goods by re-defining utility as u (Cx) ≡ u˜ (x). This implies that all the standard
rules that express the optimal tax system as a function of compensated demand elasticities
can be established within a Gorman-Lancaster setting, but where the elasticities depend on
the structure of the characteristics matrix C. Intuitively, as two goods approach one another
in characteristics space, they will become closer substitutes for one another and more equally
substitutable for leisure, in which case standard optimal tax rules call for a smaller tax rate
diﬀerential between the two goods.
Second, in the special case where the number of goods equals the number of characteristics,
the optimal tax system has a particularly nice characterization.14 In this case, the characteristics
matrix C can be inverted, so that we can represent the model solely in terms of characteristics
by writing the budget constraint as pzz = 1, where pz ≡ pC−1 is a vector of implicit prices on
characteristics. By setting tax rates on goods, the government is able to control implicit prices
on characteristics, but the untaxability of leisure implies that one characteristics price cannot
by controlled freely.15 Under this formulation, it is possible to obtain all the familiar optimal
tax rules, but where tax rates and elasticities pertain to characteristics rather than goods. This
implies that the optimal tax rate on any given characteristic depends on its complementarity
with untaxed leisure. Moreover, at any given optimal tax structure on characteristics, there is
an implied optimal tax structure on goods. In particular, we want high tax rates on goods that
are relatively intensive in the characteristics that are complementary to untaxed leisure. As
two goods approach one another in characteristics space, they become more equally intensive
in the characteristics complementary to leisure, and so the desired tax rate diﬀerential becomes
smaller.
2.5 A Generalized Gorman-Lancaster Model
Like Gorman and Lancaster, we have focused on the case of a linear consumption technology
linking goods and characteristics. Let us briefly consider a generalized specification allowing for
a nonlinear generation of characteristics, i.e.
zk = fk (x0, x1, ..., xN) , k = 0, ...,M. (20)
14An earlier version of this paper worked through this example in detail.
15A particularly simple way of capturing this restriction is by adopting the convention that one characteristic–
characteristic zero–is leisure, so that z0 ≡ x0 and qz0 = pz0 = 1.
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The model is otherwise identical to the one set out earlier, and the optimal tax problem can be
formulated in a way that is analogous to the problem in section 2.3. The optimal tax system
can be represented as follows:
Proposition 3 (Optimal Tax Rates) The optimal tax rate diﬀerential on any pair of goods
i and j is given by
tj
pj
− ti
pi
=
ρ+ μ
μa00
· ∂ log (ai/aj)
∂x0
=
ρ+ μ
μa00
·
∂ log
hPM
k=0 ωkj · ∂fk/∂xi∂fk/∂xj
i
∂x0
, (21)
where ωkj ≡
u0k
∂fk
∂xjSM
k=0 u
0
k
∂fk
∂xj
and
PM
k=0 ωkj = 1.
Proof: Analogous to the proof of Proposition 1. ¤
Proposition 3 is very similar to Proposition 1, except that the optimal tax rate diﬀerential now
depends on ∂fk/∂xi∂fk/∂xj , the relative marginal generation of characteristics of goods i and j, where the
marginal generation of characteristics is no longer constant but instead depends on what bundle
of goods is chosen. Alternatively, we could label ∂fk/∂xi∂fk/∂xj the "marginal rate of transformation" in
the consumption technology. Because relative marginal characteristics are now endogenous, the
log-derivative in the expression is not simply a re-weighting of fixed characteristics, but reflects
also a change in the characteristics themselves. However, it is still the case that, other things
being equal, the smaller the variation in marginal relative characteristics ∂fk/∂xi∂fk/∂xj across k (the
more identical goods i and j are on the margin), the smaller is the optimal tax rate diﬀerential,
tj
pj
− tipi , in absolute value.
3 Tax-Driven Product Innovation and Line Drawing
Recasting optimal taxation in characteristics space facilitates the modeling of an endogenous
set of goods. Indeed, an important advantage of the fact that real-world tax legislation specifies
commodity tax rates in terms of characteristics is its robustness to changes in the set of available
goods. The creation of new goods is an important feature of modern economies that is ignored
completely by optimal tax theory, in part because new goods are not easily tractable within the
standard framework in which a new good implies a new utility function and hence a completely
new optimal tax problem.
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In addressing this issue, we return to the case of linear characteristics generation, because the
creation of new goods poses the same conceptual problems in the nonlinear Gorman-Lancaster
model as in the standard non-characteristics model, only shifted to a diﬀerent level. In a
nonlinear characteristics approach, a change in the set of available goods does not imply a
new utility function, but it implies a new set of characteristics production functions and hence
a new optimal tax problem. Indeed, the power of the Gorman-Lancaster approach as a tool of
analysis relies crucially on the notion of linear characteristics generation.
In keeping with the tradition of optimal tax theory, the production side of the model we set
out above was implicit and very simple: firms operate under perfect competition and convert
labor into diﬀerent goods using a linear constant-returns-to-scale production technology. This
implies that producer prices q0, ..., qN equal marginal costs, which are constant. A natural
starting point for developing an optimal tax theory that incorporates the creation of new goods
is to maintain this simplified view of production. Hence, we assume that firms can create new
goods–i.e., new characteristics combinations–using a linear transformation of labor into goods
and with no setup costs, implying that there are constant returns to scale in all goods. Moreover,
free entry of firms ensures that firms have no market power in any good, new or old.16
New goods may be located at diﬀerent points in characteristics space according to a tech-
nology that we specify below. The goods-generating technology is taken to be a primitive of
the model, and therefore does not depend on the tax system. As discussed earlier, the analysis
does not deal with the potential eﬀect of taxation on technology-changing innovations that allow
previously infeasible characteristics combinations to be produced ("technology-driven product
innovation"). It deals instead with the eﬀect of the tax system on product innovations that
consist of a re-packaging of characteristics within an already feasible set in order to reduce tax
liability ("tax-driven product innovation"). The evidence discussed in the introduction suggests
that this is an empirically important phenomenon.
To clarify the central insights, we start by considering a special case where the consumer
derives utility from only two characteristics (and leisure). The two-dimensional characteristics
16Product innovation raises interesting questions pertaining to increasing returns to scale (due to setup costs)
and imperfect competition. Such issues are ignored in the standard optimal tax model (with a fixed set of available
goods), and we also ignore them here. Our model should be interpreted as dealing with purely tax-driven product
innovations rather than innovations motivated by gaining market power. Tax-driven innovations reflect a re-
packaging of characteristics that require no technological innovation (no R&D), and are therefore not associated
with significant setup costs.
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model is helpful to establish intuition, because it allows a graphical exposition of the model
and results. However, our main results do not rely on this simplification, and in section 3.4 we
present an analysis of the general case.
3.1 A Two-Characteristics Model with Endogenous Goods
The setup described above implies that the full gain of introducing a new good accrues to
the consumer, and we can then incorporate the choice of what goods are produced into the
consumer’s utility maximization problem. We pose the consumer’s problem in two stages. First,
we consider how the consumer optimizes the set of available goods and the demand for each
good in the absence of a tax system. Then we introduce a tax system, and address how the
consumer re-optimizes the set of goods produced and the demand for each good in the presence
of taxes.
The consumer derives utility from leisure and two characteristics so that u = u (x0, z1, z2).
Characteristics are generated from goods in a linear fashion, so that one unit of good i generates
c1i units of characteristic 1 and c2i units of characteristic 2. As before, we denote by ci ≡ (c1i, c2i)
the characteristics vector of good i. Unlike in the earlier model, consumers can choose how many
goods will be produced and where in characteristics space they will be located within a set of
feasible goods. We therefore have to allow for an arbitrary number of possible goods, and in fact
we will allow for a continuum of possible goods. However, as mentioned earlier, a model with
two characteristics can sustain at most two goods in equilibrium. If we start from a situation
with two goods and a new good is introduced in the market, then, if the new good survives in
equilibrium, it will replace one of the existing goods. Hence, although we allow for an unbounded
number of potential goods, this is really a 2× 2 model.
The linearity of the consumption technology implies that any producible good generates
characteristics along a ray in characteristics space, as illustrated in Figure 1. The ray associated
with good i, ri, has a slope equal to the characteristics ratio of this good, c2ic1i . Following Lancaster
(1975), we will assume that goods can be put on the market on any ray in characteristics
space and therefore with any ratio of characteristics. Certain characteristics ratios may be
technologically diﬃcult (costly) to produce, whereas other characteristics ratios may be easy
(cheap) to produce. By choosing units of all goods so that producer prices equal one, if a
given characteristics ratio is technologically diﬃcult to achieve, this shows up in the feasible
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characteristics vector at the given producer price of one, not in the price itself. At any given ray
ri in characteristics space, there is a maximum obtainable level of characteristics (c1i, c2i) per
unit of a good with the characteristics ratio along this ray. As shown in the figure, this implies
a curve of producible characteristics combinations. This curve gives the maximum amount of
characteristic 2 as a function of the amount of characteristic 1 per unit of a good. Notice that, in
the absence of taxation and under the normalization of producer prices to be equal to one, this
represents an iso-cost curve of producible goods. We label this the Goods Possibility Frontier
(GPF).
The choice of goods in this model depends crucially on the shape of the GPF. Figure 1 depicts
the GPF as a bumpy curve that contains both concave and convex portions. Consider first a
concave segment such as the segment from point c1 (good 1) to point c3 (good 3). If goods 1 and
3 are put on the market, the consumer can obtain characteristics vectors c1 and c3 as well as
any linear combination in between these two vectors.17 However, no matter what characteristics
bundle is consumed using goods 1 and 3 (say, point A), this bundle is strictly dominated by
a bundle that can be achieved by introducing a single good at the appropriate ray in between
goods 1 and 3 (say, good 2 on ray r2). In general, under concavity of the GPF, it is better to
introduce one good with the appropriate characteristics ratio than combining diﬀerent goods
to obtain the desired consumption of characteristics. Hence, if the GPF is globally concave, we
observe only one good in equilibrium. The result that under global concavity only one good
exists is not specific to the two-characteristic model, but extends to the case ofM characteristics.
The implication of this discussion is that global concavity cannot be an accurate depiction of
the real world, which is one where consumers purchase a large number of diﬀerent goods.
Consider instead a convex segment on the GPF such as the segment between points c3 (good
3) and c5 (good 5). Here we have the opposite situation of the one just described, because now
a single good (such as good 4 at c4) is strictly dominated by a convex combination of the two
goods on each side. Moreover, as we increase the distance between the two goods, we strictly
expand the set of characteristics bundles that become possible through linear combinations of
the two goods. In general, under global convexity, there is always an incentive to make goods
more extreme by increasing how much they provide of one characteristic and reducing how much
17Only linear combinations between the two goods are obtainable given the assumption that "short sales" of
goods are not feasible (x1, x2 ≥ 0). This assumption is clearly reasonable in the context of consumption goods.
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they provide of the other characteristic. There exists no optimum in this model, except if we
impose bounds on the amount of characteristics that can be provided by goods, in which case
the optimum consists of corner goods located at those bounds. For example, if it is not possible
to produce goods that contain negative amounts of a given characteristic, each good will be
located at a corner point where it contains the maximum amount of one characteristic and none
of the other.18 As before, this is a general point that extends to the M -characteristics case.19
Hence, global convexity is also an unrealistic depiction of the real world, which features many
goods that combine several characteristics at once.
Having ruled out both global concavity and global convexity as reasonable assumptions, it
follows that the GPF is indeed a bumpy curve of the general form shown in the figure. The
concave bumps on the curve are "natural" goods in the sense that they reflect characteristics
combinations that are technologically easy to produce, i.e., they provide relatively large amounts
of the two characteristics. The locally concave portions are therefore the natural candidates for
the goods chosen in equilibrium.
To see what goods are chosen in equilibrium, Figure 2 uses the GPF to construct a Char-
acteristics Possibility Frontier (CPF). The CPF shows the maximum amount of characteristic
2 as a function of characteristic 1 that can be consumed by combining diﬀerent goods on the
GPF.20 For example, if the individual wants to consume z∗1 units of characteristic 1, the maxi-
mum amount of characteristic 2 is z∗2 and it is achieved by introducing goods 1 and 2 at c
∗
1 and
c∗2. In general, the CPF consists of linear segments that are tangent to the GPF as well as curvy
segments that follow the GPF around its concave peaks.21 On each linear segment, characteris-
tics bundles are generated by combining two goods, whereas on each curvy and strictly concave
18The assumption that negative characteristic generation is infeasible is just made for the purpose of this
example. We do not make this assumption in the analysis (as shown in the figure), and it does not seem
reasonable to do so. If negative characteristics are possible, and under global convexity, goods will be located at
corner points with a positive amount of one characteristic and the largest possible negative amount of the other
characteristic.
19Notice that, under global convexity and infeasibility of negative characteristic generation, goods are chosen in
such a way that the characteristics matrix C becomes diagonal. As mentioned in Section 2, the model then reduces
to a standard non-characteristics model. Hence, extending the Gorman-Lancaster model to allow for endogenous
goods provides precise conditions under which the characteristics and standard approaches are equivalent.
20Because the GPF is an iso-cost curve of producible goods, the CPF is an iso-cost curve of consumption
possibilities in characteristics space. In other words, the CPF is a budget line (accounting for endogenous goods)
in characteristics space.
21Because the slopes of adjacent linear segments are diﬀerent, they will not be tangent to the GPF at the same
point. This is the reason that the CPF does not feature sharp kinks, but is instead characterized by "curvy kinks"
around the local concave peaks.
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segment bundles are generated from just one good.
As we have not yet introduced taxation into the model, and given that the model features
no other market imperfections, the construction of the CPF in Figure 2 reflects both private
and social eﬃciency. In particular, the set of goods that span the no-tax CPF corresponds to
the set of both privately and socially eﬃcient goods. There are many socially eﬃcient goods
(infinitely many, in fact), because we have continua of eﬃcient goods around the concave peaks.
However, at any given desired characteristics bundle, there will be at most two socially eﬃcient
goods associated with that particular bundle.
To make these remarks formal, we denote by c2j = g (c1j) the relationship between charac-
teristics coeﬃcients for an arbitrary good j on the GPF-curve. We can state the following:
Lemma 1 (Socially Eﬃcient Goods) With only two characteristics, the equilibrium consists
of at most two goods. Assume that, in the absence of a tax system, goods 1 and 2 are introduced in
the market and denote their characteristics vectors by c∗1 ≡ (c∗11, g (c∗11)) and c∗2 ≡ (c∗12, g (c∗12)).
Goods 1 and 2 are the socially eﬃcient goods and for any other producible good, j,with charac-
teristics cj ≡ (c1j , g (c1j)), we have
g (c1j) ≤ ν∗ · g (c∗11) + (1− ν∗) · g (c∗12) , (22)
where ν∗ ≡ c
∗
12−c1j
c∗12−c∗11
.
Proof: In the appendix. ¤
We order goods so that, in the no-tax equilibrium, goods 1 and 2 are put on the market.22 The
chosen varieties of these two goods, c∗1 and c
∗
2, depend on the properties of both g (.) and u (.).
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We adopt the convention that varieties are chosen such that good 2 is the one relatively intensive
in characteristic 2, i.e.
g(c∗12)
c∗12
>
g(c∗11)
c∗11
. All other potential goods are socially inferior to goods 1
and 2, meaning that the characteristics possibilities allowed by introducing any of these goods
22As mentioned, it is possible that only one good is introduced. Our analysis extends to this case, but the
optimal commodity tax problem is obviously more interesting with (at least) two goods. In a later section where
we generalize the analysis to the case of M characteristics and N goods, we will explicitly allow for N < M in
equilibrium.
23That is, the properties of g (.) determine the set of goods (picked from the GPF) that maximize characteristics
possibilities (as reflected by the CPF). In Figure 2, this set consists of point A, segment B to c∗2, segment c∗1 to
D, and point E (there are more goods in this set to the left of A and to the right of E). We refer to this as the set
of goods that span the CPF. Then, at a given CPF, the properties of u (.) determine which consumption bundle
is chosen (e.g., z∗ in Figure 2), and therefore determine the specific goods (e.g., c∗1 and c∗2) that are chosen from
among the entire set that spans the CPF.
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are in the interior of the characteristics possibility set generated by goods 1 and 2. Eq. (22) in
Lemma 1 gives the formal definition of a "socially inferior" good.
3.2 The Eﬀect of a Tax System on the Set of Goods
We now consider a government that must raise revenue from commodity taxation. Because the
no-tax equilibrium sustains only goods 1 and 2, it might seem that the tax system could simply
specify a rate t1 applying to goods on ray r1, and a rate t2 applying to goods on ray r2. But
such a policy would be incomplete because, if a new good were to be introduced along a new
ray in characteristics space, the tax system would have no way of dealing with the new good.
Hence, in order to be robust to the introduction of new goods, a tax system must specify tax
rates associated with both existing and potential combinations in characteristics space. With an
unconstrained (by administrative considerations) set of instruments, a tax system could specify
a selective tax rate on each potential good in characteristics space. However, this implies an
infinite number of distinct tax rates, which is obviously unrealistic. Instead, real-world tax
systems define regions–draw lines–in characteristics space that are subject to diﬀerent rates of
tax. We start by considering a government that defines two tax regions, and therefore sets tax
rates t1 and t2 along with a line separating the two regions.24 The line is a ray in characteristics
space with slope c. If a good i is characterized by c2ic1i > c, it is taxed at rate t2; otherwise it is
taxed at rate t1. Unless uniform taxation is optimal, the optimal line has to be located between
the characteristic rays of the two existing goods, i.e.
g(c∗12)
c∗12
> c ≥ g(c
∗
11)
c∗11
.
Figure 3 illustrates the implications of a non-uniform tax system (t1, t2, c) that imposes a
higher tax rate on goods that are relatively intensive in characteristic 2 (t2 > t1). In the absence
of taxation, the Goods Possibility Frontier is represented by the dashed curve GPF∗, and the
Characteristics Possibility Frontier is given by the solid line CPF∗. Note that CPF∗ is tangent
to GPF∗ at points c∗1 and c
∗
2, which are the privately and socially optimal goods associated with
characteristics bundles in the range between these goods. The introduction of the tax system
shifts down the CPF associated with goods 1 and 2 to the solid line CPFt12. The tax system
also shifts down the GPF, because it is an iso-cost curve of possible goods. The downward shift
at any ray is proportional to the tax rate and is therefore diﬀerent on each side of the line: the
24Later on, we consider the possibility that the government may want to define more than two tax regions and
hence draw additional lines in characteristics space.
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GPF shifts down according to t2 on the left-side of the line, while it shifts down according to t1
on the right-side. The after-tax GPF, labelled GPFt, is associated with a discontinuity (notch)
at the line c, reflecting that the tax liability associated with a good changes discretely as its
characteristics cross the statutory line.
As shown in the figure, some goods that were dominated by other goods in the absence of
taxation are no longer so. New goods have become potentially optimal in three diﬀerent regions.
First, goods that are similar to good 1 but more intensive in characteristic 2 (the segment from
E to F) are located above the after-tax CPF associated with goods 1 and 2, so that introducing
such goods would expand consumption possibilities. These are low-tax goods that represent
slightly modified versions of the original low-tax good with a little bit more of the high-tax
characteristic.25 It is a general result that, for a line strictly above ray r1, marginal product
shifting around the low-tax good is optimal. To see this, notice that a proportional shift of the
GPF does not aﬀect its slope along rays in characteristics space, and therefore the slopes of
GPFt and GPF∗ are the same along ray r1. Hence, because GPF∗ is tangent to CPF∗ at ray
r1 and CPF∗ is steeper than CPFt12, we have that GPF
t must be steeper than CPFt12 at ray r1.
This implies that there exists a range of producible goods close to ray r1 that can expand the set
of consumption possibilities. The intuition for this result has two components. By replacing the
original low-tax good by a low-tax good that provides more of the high-tax characteristic per
unit of the good, the consumer is able to obtain a given amount of the high-tax characteristic by
buying more of the low-tax good and less of the high-tax good, and thereby reduce tax liability.
Moreover, if the new good is close enough to the original good, it is only slightly inferior from
a technological point of view. Indeed, by the envelope theorem, as we move the characteristics
of a good marginally away from their optimal composition, there is no first-order loss to the
consumer.
Second, goods that are almost the same as good 2 on its left side (on the segment between
A to B) now dominate good 2 in characteristics space. These are high-tax goods very much like
the original high-tax good, but that provide even more of the high-tax characteristic. As above,
this is a general phenomenon that can be understood from the observations that the no-tax and
after-tax GPFs have identical slopes along rays along with the fact that CPFt12 is flatter than
25 In the discussion, we refer to characteristic 2 as the "high-tax characteristic", although this is a somewhat
imprecise terminology as taxes apply to goods (depending on their characteristics), not to characteristics per se.
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CPF∗, implying that GPFt is steeper than CPF∗12 around point B. The economic intuition for
the optimality of shifting high-tax goods towards the high-tax characteristic is essentially the
same as the intuition for shifting low-tax goods in the same direction: conditional on a good
being on the high-tax side of the line, making it more extreme in the high-tax characteristic
does not trigger additional tax liability per unit of the good, and allows the consumer to obtain
a given total amount of the high-tax characteristic while buying fewer units of the high-tax
good. Moreover, if the good is located close enough to the original high-tax good, it will be only
slightly inferior from the technological viewpoint.
Third, depending on the location of the line, there may be new goods close to the line (at the
segment from C to D) that are able to expand the set of characteristics possibilities. As Figure 3
is drawn, the good located exactly on the line dominates the other possible goods in this range,
but this is not always true and depends on the shape of the GPF around the line. What makes
the good exactly on the line particularly desirable in the figure is the fact that the line is located
at a convex portion of the GPF. If the line was instead located at a locally concave portion of
the GPF, we might see new products close to, but to the right of, the line. In general, if the line
is suﬃciently close to the original high-tax good, we always see tax-driven product innovation
close to the line, on the low-tax side. In particular, as we move the line arbitrarily close to
the original high-tax good, we allow the introduction of a good that is almost identical to the
high-tax good, but on the low-tax side of the line, allowing the consumer to completely avoid
the high tax rate and with no first-order loss from the new good being technologically inferior.
As we will see later, this kind of tax system (rates plus line) is almost certainly not optimal.
It is theoretically possible that, in addition to product innovation around the original goods
and around the line, a tax system may induce product innovation at interior local peaks in the
low-tax region. This may be the case if the GPF features local peaks that, in the absence of a
tax system, are dominated by surrounding higher peaks. If such peaks exist on the low-tax side
of the line, there may be privately optimal goods in those regions once taxes are imposed.
To clarify the eﬀect of a tax system on the choice of goods, Figure 4 illustrates the after-tax
Characteristics Possibility Frontier, CPFt, that accounts for the re-optimization of the set of
goods in response to the tax system. In between points A and C, the after-tax CPF combines a
new high-tax good (that is slightly more intensive in the high-tax characteristic) with a new low-
tax good located on the line. In between points C and E, the after-tax CPF combines two new
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low-tax goods, the one right on the line and one close to the original low-tax good that is slightly
more intensive in the high-tax characteristic. In between points E and F, characteristics are
generated from just one good, a new low-tax good close to the original low-tax good. The goods
chosen in equilibrium depend on the demand for characteristics and therefore on preferences.
These arguments imply that, as the government introduces non-uniform commodity taxa-
tion based on characteristics, privately optimal goods become more intensive in the high-tax
characteristic within each tax region. At the same time, across-region substitution eﬀects may
lead goods in the high-tax region to disappear completely (e.g., if the consumer’s optimum is at
a point such as D in Figure 4). Whatever the set of goods in equilibrium, the total consump-
tion of the high-tax characteristic will go down in response to the tax system (as the CPFt is
everywhere flatter than CPF∗), but the consumer is able to counteract this eﬀect somewhat by
re-packaging the characteristics of goods within each tax region to provide more of the high-tax
characteristic.26
We can state the following:
Proposition 4 (Tax-Driven Product Innovation) Consider the eﬀects of a non-uniform
tax system with two tax regions, i.e., (t1, t2, c) where t2 6= t1 and g(c
∗
12)
c∗12
> c ≥ g(c
∗
11)
c∗11
. We have:
a. The original high-tax good is always eliminated. Either high-tax goods disappear completely,
or a new high-tax good appears that contains more of the high-tax characteristic than the
original good.
b. The original low-tax good may survive or it may be eliminated. If it is eliminated, one
or two new low-tax goods will appear that each contain more of the high-tax characteristic
than the original good. New low-tax goods may be located either exactly on the line c or at
the interior of the low-tax region.
Proof: In the appendix. ¤
Each possible type of tax-driven product innovation in the proposition is distortionary, because
each represents a change from the set of socially eﬃcient goods. The new goods are introduced
in response to distorted price signals, and this behavioral response lowers tax revenue and
26The statement that the consumption of the high-tax characteristic goes down in response to taxation implicitly
assumes that the uncompensated demand curve for that characteristis is negatively sloped.
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creates deadweight loss. Note, however, that the diﬀerent types of tax-driven product innovation
may have very diﬀerent welfare implications. In particular, new goods located close to the
original goods are only marginally socially ineﬃcient and therefore imply small welfare losses.
By contrast, the introduction of new goods located close to the line cause larger welfare losses
if the line is drawn at a place with very ineﬃcient goods (as in Figure 4). Such goods may
be optimal to the consumer despite being strongly socially ineﬃcient because they reduce tax
liability substantially, but they are associated with large welfare losses.
We note the following:
Remark 1 (Two Tax Regions) A non-uniform tax system (t1, t2, c) where t2 > t1 and
g(c∗12)
c∗12
>
c ≥ g(c
∗
11)
c∗11
inevitably causes tax-driven product innovation. Setting c =
g(c∗11)
c∗11
avoids product in-
novation on the low-tax side of the line, but in this case there will still be product innovation on
the high-tax side of the line.
As background for our analysis of optimal tax systems in the next section, it is helpful to
consider tax systems that define more than two tax regions. In particular, note that with three
tax regions it is possible to eliminate tax-driven product innovation:
Remark 2 (Three Tax Regions) Consider a non-uniform tax system (t1, t2, t3, c1, c2) where
t3 > t2 > t1 and c2 ≥
g(c∗12)
c∗12
> c1 ≥
g(c∗11)
c∗11
. At any given t1 and t2, this tax system can avoid tax-
driven product innovation by setting c1 =
g(c∗11)
c∗11
, c2 =
g(c∗12)
c∗12
, and selecting t3 suﬃciently high.
Under this tax system, the socially eﬃcient goods survive in equilibrium and are both located at
a border between tax regions. No good in equilibrium is subject to the high tax rate t3.
Hence, if the government has a suﬃcient number of commodity tax rates (i.e., tax regions), it
is feasible to completely avoid the distortion associated with a change in the set of available goods
by drawing lines appropriately. However, because of the inability to tax leisure, a commodity
tax system that does not distort the set of available goods is still not a first-best tax system. In a
second-best environment, it is not a priori obvious that the optimal tax system features exactly
the same set of goods that is associated with the first-best allocation. After all, an important
implication of the theory of second best is that, typically, it is not optimal to eliminate distortions
completely: it is better to have several small distortions than to have large distortions somewhere
and none elsewhere. The most famous and most consequential exception to this guideline is
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the production eﬃciency theorem by Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) showing that the optimal
tax system maintains the economy on the production possibility frontier. The next section
characterizes second-best optimal allocation in our setting, and demonstrates that it does in
fact avoid the introduction of goods that are socially ineﬃcient.
3.3 The Second-Best Optimal Allocation
We characterize the second-best optimal allocation, assuming that the government must raise a
given revenue from commodity taxation and that it cannot tax leisure, as in the Ramsey optimal
tax problem considered in Section 2. We will show that the solution to this problem does not
feature the introduction of socially inferior goods, and that the set of goods in equilibrium is
therefore first-best. In order to establish this, it is suﬃcient to allow for one new good, and
show that no matter where this good is located within the feasible set, it is dominated by the
socially eﬃcient goods in the government’s problem. This implies that we have to allow for
three potential goods; the socially eﬃcient goods 1 and 2 associated with characteristics c∗1 and
c∗2 and a potential new good (say, good 3) associated with characteristics (c13, g (c13)) that is
chosen by the consumer in light of the tax system.
In this section, we impose additional structure on the problem in order to simplify the
analysis, while in the next section we demonstrate the result in a very general setting. In
particular, it greatly simplifies the analysis to normalize the characteristics of the socially eﬃcient
goods, so that good 1 delivers only characteristic 1 and good 2 delivers only characteristic 2,
i.e. c∗1 ≡ (1, 0) and c∗2 ≡ (0, 1). The Goods Possibility Frontier, g (.), has to be such that these
are indeed the socially eﬃcient goods. From Lemma 1, this implies g (c13) ≤ 1 − c13 for the
socially ineﬃcient good 3. This imposes a very simple structure on the problem, but as we show
in Section 3.4, it involves no loss of generality.
The government chooses x1, x2, and x3 so as to maximize the representative consumer’s
utility subject to the government revenue constraint, the consumer’s first-order conditions, and
the zero tax on leisure. Under the normalizations of good 1 and 2, the utility function is
given by u (x0, x1 + c13x3, x2 + g (c13)x3). As in Section 2, we solve the optimal tax problem
by specifying it in terms of the distance function. The distance function can be written as
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a (u¯, x0, x1 + c13x3, x2 + g (c13)x3) and is implicitly defined by
u
µ
x0
a
,
x1 + c13x3
a
,
x2 + g (c13)x3
a
¶
= u¯, (23)
so that the utility function can be redefined as a (u, x0, x1 + c13x3, x2 + g (c13)x3) = 1. The
government budget constraint can be combined with the consumer budget constraint into a
resource constraint:
1− x0 − x1 − x2 − x3 = R. (24)
The government must also account for a condition reflecting that the consumer optimizes untaxed
leisure at any given choice of x1, x2, and x3. Thus,
∂a (.)
∂x0
= 1, (25)
which implicitly defines a function x0 = x0 (u, x1 + c13x3, x2 + g (c13)x3). We may then formu-
late the government’s problem as choosing x1, x2, and x3 to maximize
u− ρ [a (u, x0 (.) , x1 + c13x3, x2 + g (c13)x3)− 1] + μ [1− x0 (.)− x1 − x2 − x3 −R] . (26)
We can show the following:
Proposition 5 (Product Eﬃciency) In the second-best optimal allocation, the socially infe-
rior good 3 is not introduced. Only goods on the no-tax Characteristics Possibility Frontier may
be produced and consumed. Thus, despite the allocation being second-best, the set of available
goods is first-best (at any given demand for characteristics).
Proof: In the appendix. ¤
The second-best optimal tax system completely avoids tax-driven product innovations of socially
inferior goods, i.e. goods located in the interior of the no-tax Characteristics Possibility Frontier.
Four points are worth noting about this proposition. First, the result is related to the
Diamond-Mirrlees production eﬃciency theorem, although the model and proof are diﬀerent
from their setting. While the classic result deals with the production of goods from inputs,
Proposition 5 deals with the "production" of characteristics from goods. In other words, the
proposition above is a statement about the choice of products, not the choice of inputs, and it
might alternatively be labeled a product eﬃciency theorem.
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Second, the result imposes no a priori restrictions on the set of tax instruments besides the
inability to tax leisure. This is consistent with the Diamond-Mirrlees setting, which also assumes
that there is no limit to the ability of the government to vary tax rates across goods. While
Proposition 5 is a statement about allocation, not implementation, the implied tax policy can
be inferred from Remarks 1 and 2. We see that, in order to implement the second-best optimal
allocation with a tax policy, the government has to define at least three tax regions in two-
dimensional characteristics space. If, for administrative reasons, the government is restricted to
only two tax regions, i.e. (t1, t2, c), the optimal instruments under such a system will necessarily
involve some purely tax-driven product innovation. Moreover, for a three-region tax system
to avoid tax-driven product innovation, lines must be located exactly at the socially optimal
goods, requiring that the government can perfectly observe characteristics. While this is a
strong assumption, it is not conceptually diﬀerent from the canonical assumption in optimal
tax theory that the government perfectly observes behavioral elasticities. In fact, as discussed
earlier, because the characteristics coeﬃcients in a Gorman-Lancaster model should be seen as
objective and measurable entities that do not change with the quantities consumed of goods,
they are likely to be more observable than price elasticities.
Third, while the proposition rules out socially ineﬃcient goods in the second-best optimum, it
does not rule out that the optimal tax system aﬀects the set of goods in equilibrium. To see this,
notice that any non-uniform tax system is associated with substitution eﬀects on the amounts
consumed of diﬀerent characteristics, which may aﬀect the derived demand for goods generating
those characteristics. In particular, as demand shifts toward the low-tax characteristic, we
may see the introduction of goods that are relatively intensive in the low-tax characteristic or
the elimination of goods that are intensive in the high-tax characteristic. This is a form of tax-
driven product innovation, but one that is driven by traditional substitution eﬀects on consumer
demand and, critically, any new goods introduced this way will be eﬃcient, i.e. located on the
no-tax Characteristics Possibility Frontier.
Fourth, the result also does not rule out that new goods are introduced as a result of
technology-driven product innovations that allow previously infeasible characteristics combi-
nations to be produced. Indeed, if new characteristics combinations were invented that expand
the characteristics possibility set, our proposition implies that such characteristics combination
should be allowed by the second-best optimal tax system. In our context, technology-driven
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product innovations can be modeled as an outward shift of the GPF. Obviously, such a change
of technology would change the underlying parameters of the optimal tax problem and might
therefore imply a diﬀerent optimal tax system, as would be the case in the standard model
when technological innovation occurs. Whether or not a tax reform is necessary following such
innovations depends on the form of innovation (the change in the GPF). For example, if the
innovation is one that proportionally improves all existing goods (a parallel shift of the GPF),
relative characteristics and the set of eﬃcient goods remain the same, and so the optimal tax
system does not change. By contrast, if an innovation favors specific regions in characteristics
space (say, by creating a new local peak on the GPF, or expanding an existing one), it may
change the set of socially eﬃcient goods, in which case the tax system would in general have to
undergo reform.27
Finally, we can state the following about optimal tax rates:
Remark 3 (Optimal Tax Rates) Whether or not the tax system avoids tax-driven product
innovation, optimal tax rates on the two goods in equilibrium satisfy the rule in Proposition 1.
Proof: From Lemma 1, we always have at most two goods in equilibrium. Conditional on the
characteristics combinations of those two goods, the optimal tax problem in eq. (26) is a special
case of the problem in eq. (16). ¤
3.4 The Second-Best Optimal Allocation in the General N ×M Case
The two-characteristic model is illuminating to consider because it allows a simple graphical
exposition of the model and results. However, the basic reasoning presented above does not
rely on the dimensionality of the problem, and in this section we generalize our results to the
case of M characteristics and N market goods chosen from a continuous set of potential goods
in M -dimensional characteristics space. Consider therefore a consumer with a utility function
u = (x0, z) where characteristics are generated from market goods according to z = Cx. Notice
that, although we maintain the simplifying assumption from the previous section that leisure
x0 is a direct argument in the utility function, the specification is still flexible enough to retain
27An interesting research question would be to explore optimal tax policy when taxes directly aﬀects the
incentives for technology-driven product innovations via eﬀects on R&D. As a reduced form, this is a case where
the location of the GPF depends directly on the tax system. This question is beyond the scope of this paper and
we leave it as a topic for future research.
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the standard model u (x) as a special case (when C is diagonal) and therefore does not impose
a specific optimal tax rate structure.
We start by dividing the set of potential goods into those that are located on the no-tax
Characteristics Possibility Frontier (socially eﬃcient goods), and those that are located at the
interior of this frontier (socially inferior goods). The Characteristics Possibility Frontier repre-
sents cost minimization at any given bundle of characteristics z. At no-tax prices, there will be
a set of goods 1, ...,N solving this problem, and we denote by C∗ the characteristics matrix of
these socially eﬃcient goods. Notice that, if a good i is located at the interior of the no-tax
Characteristics Possibility Frontier, this means that the characteristics provided by a unit of
this good, ci = (c1i, ..., cMi), can be achieved at a lower cost under no-tax prices by purchasing
non-negative amounts of the N socially eﬃcient goods.
One question is whether a second-best optimal tax system allows for the introduction of a
new good that is not part of the socially eﬃcient set 1, ..., N . We only have to account for one
such good, N+1, and show that no matter where this good is located within the feasible set, it is
dominated by the socially eﬃcient goods in the government’s problem. As discussed above, this
statement does not imply that no new goods are introduced following the imposition of taxation,
because demand-substitution eﬀects will change the bundle of characteristics consumed z, and
the set of cost eﬃcient goods is endogenous to the chosen bundle.
Good N +1 has characteristics cN+1 = (c1N+1, ..., cMN+1), which may be located anywhere
on a hyperplane in RM of feasible goods, g (cN+1) = 0. We may write the consumption tech-
nology as z = C∗x+ cN+1xN+1, and we may define the utility function in terms of the distance
function as a (u, x0, z) = a (u, x0,C∗x+ cN+1xN+1) = 1.
The government maximizes utility subject to an exogenous revenue requirement and a zero
tax on leisure. We can formulate this problem as maximizing u with respect to x0, ..., xN , xN+1,
subject to
(i) a (u, x0,C∗x+ cN+1xN+1) = 1, (ii) 1−
N+1X
i=0
xi = R, (iii) a0 (u, x0,C∗x+ cN+1xN+1) = 1,
(27)
where cN+1 must satisfy g (cN+1) = 0. This problem is analogous to the earlier problem
(with a fixed set of goods) in eq. (15). Condition (iii) implicitly defines a function x0 =
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x0 (u, x1, ..., xN , xN+1), and the government therefore maximizes
u− ρ [a (u, x0 (.) ,C∗x+ cN+1xN+1)− 1] + μ
"
1− x0 (.)−
N+1X
i=1
xi −R
#
(28)
We can then state the following:
Proposition 6 (Product Eﬃciency) In the second-best optimal allocation, a socially inferior
good such as N+1 is not introduced. Only goods on the no-tax Characteristics Possibility Frontier
1, ..., N are allowed, and the set of available goods is therefore first-best.
Proof: In the appendix. ¤
This proposition is analogous to Proposition 5, and the interpretations are the same.
4 Conclusion
Any tax system imposing selective commodity taxation must have procedures for assigning
diﬀerent goods to tax rate categories, and real-world tax legislation does this on the basis of
observable characteristics. Writing tax laws in terms of characteristics is intuitive and allows a
tax system to handle a constantly evolving set of available goods. In this paper, we recast the
theory of optimal taxation in the language of characteristics using the Gorman-Lancaster model
of consumer behavior, and develop a theory of tax-driven product innovation and optimal line
drawing. We present optimal tax rules that depend on characteristics in an intuitive way: the
closer two goods are in characteristics space, the greater their substitutability and the smaller
the optimal tax rate diﬀerential. We point out that, whenever the number of tax instruments is
finite, tax systems have to draw lines that define tax-rate regions in characteristics space. Such
lines are associated with unavoidable discontinuities, or notches, in tax liability as a function of
characteristics, and can create incentives to introduce new goods that are similar to the existing
goods as well as qualitatively diﬀerent goods that–in order to avoid the high tax rate–have
characteristics just on the low-tax side of the line. All goods that are introduced in response
to the tax system are more intensive in the high-tax characteristic than the existing goods in
the same tax region. These goods are socially inferior (but privately optimal) in characteristics
space, and therefore represents a distortion in the set of available goods.
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We show that second-best optimal tax systems draw lines so as to completely avoid such
tax-driven product innovations: only goods located on the frontier of the no-tax characteristics
possibility set should be allowed in the market. Hence, although the tax system is second-best,
the set of goods produced is first-best given the demand for characteristics. This may be seen as
a form of production eﬃciency theorem applied to the production of characteristics from goods;
we refer to it as a product eﬃciency theorem. The result does not rule out that the tax system
aﬀects the equilibrium set of goods being produced, because the set of socially eﬃcient goods
depends on the demand for characteristics, which changes as the result of taxation.
The analysis is framed in terms of the classic Ramsey model of second-best eﬃcient revenue
collection, because we feel this is a natural starting point for establishing a characteristics-
based theory of optimal taxation and line drawing. In practice, there are of course several
other reasons for tax diﬀerentiation such as externalities, internalities, or distributional equity.
However, whatever the motivation for tax diﬀerentiation, a tax system has to assign goods to
tax rate categories by drawing lines in characteristics space, which give rise to the kind of eﬀects
we have explored in this paper. Hence, we believe that the basic insights presented here are
widely applicable, regardless of the reason for tax rate diﬀerentiation.
The existing literature does not address the salient features of real-world tax systems that we
explore: characteristics-based tax rules, line drawing and notches in characteristics space, and
the tax-driven product innovation this generates. Although we have addressed these issues in
the context of a consumption tax, they are a ubiquitous feature of all forms of taxation. As an
example, consider a Nordic-style dual income tax in which labor income and capital income are
subject to separate rate schedules. Any dual income tax must diﬀerentiate–i.e., draw a line–
between the two types of income, especially with regard to self-employment income. At one
time in the Norwegian dual income tax, the complicated rules used to determine whether small
business income is taxed as capital or labor income involved notches, such as where shareholders
who worked less than 300 hours in the business were not classified as active owners and thus
whose income was treated as (preferentially taxed) capital income. Another example arises
whenever an income tax allows for the deductibility of interest payments by businesses but not
for the return to the providers of equity capital. In this situation, it is inevitable that financial
innovation will produce securities that are just debt-like enough to qualify for the deduction. In
the U.S., the tax code has not defined debt and equity explicitly, and courts have articulated
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many factors (i.e., characteristics) to be considered in classification; one well-known case listed
sixteen factors to be considered, including the provision of a fixed rate of interest and a provision
for redemption at the option of the holder.28 As a final example, many countries’ income tax
systems must distinguish between employees, on whose behalf employers must withhold and
remit tax liability, and independent contractors, for whom the employer does not have these,
and other, legal responsibilities. In the U.S., the IRS uses a 20-factor characteristic-based test
that guides the categorization, involving such factors as whether the work is performed on the
business’s premises and whether the employer has the right to discharge the worker.
Extending the insights of the model to a broader set of such situations will in some cases
require some modifications to the model developed here. One challenge will be to provide a
principled explanation for why the optimal tax treatment is not uniform, for example between
debt and equity finance or among workers with varying relationships with employers. Another
will be to allow for heterogeneous tastes with respect to the underlying objects of demand,
whether they are the characteristics that goods provide or the stochastic pattern of returns that
securities provide, which may generate a “thick” set of goods (or, e.g., securities) in equilibrium.
Such enrichments will broaden the policy applicability of the approach we have developed, which
can address product innovation, some of which is purely tax-driven, and line drawing.
A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
From eq. (16), the first-order condition with respect to xj is given by
ρ
∙
∂a
∂xj
+
∂a
∂x0
∂x0 (.)
∂xj
¸
+ μ
∙
∂x0 (.)
∂xj
+ qj
¸
= 0, ∀j.
Using the implicit function theorem, we have ∂x0(.)∂xj = −
a0j
a00 . By inserting this along with
∂a
∂xj
= aj = pj , ∂a∂x0 = a0 = 1, and qj = pj − tj , and subtracting the first-order conditions for
goods i and j, we obtain
tj
pj
− ti
pi
=
ρ+ μ
μa00
·
½
a0i
ai
− a0j
aj
¾
, ∀j.
Using the symmetry of the Antonelli terms and the identity ai0ai −
aj0
aj
=
∂ log(ai/aj)
∂x0
, the above
expression is equivalent to the first equality in eq. (17).
28Fin Hay Realty v. United States, 398 F.2d 694 (3d Cir. 1968).
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To obtain the second equality, we rewrite (11) as
ai
aj
=
MX
k=0
u0kcki
∇u · cj =
MX
k=0
u0kckj
∇u · cj ·
cki
ckj
.
In this expression, all marginal utilities are "compensated" in the sense that consumption levels
are divided through by the distance function a (u,Cx).29 By defining ωkj ≡
u0kckj
∇u·cj , we obtain
the second equality in eq. (17). ¤
A.2 Proof of Lemma 1
The problem of finding the optimal set of goods 1, ...,N can be formulated as choosing quantities
of goods x1, ..., xN at diﬀerent points on the GPF, g (.), so as to determine at which charac-
teristics combinations quantities are positive. This problem can be formulated either as cost
minimization at a given characteristics bundle (z∗1 , z
∗
2), or as maximizing the amount of one
characteristic (such as z2) at a given amount of the other characteristic (z1 = z∗1) and at a given
total expenditure on goods (y∗), i.e.
max
x1,...,xN
NX
i=1
g (c1i)xi subject to
NX
i=1
c1ixi = z∗1 ,
NX
i=1
xi = y∗, and xi ≥ 0 i = 1, ..., N.
Denote by (α1, α2) the Lagrange multipliers associated with the two equality constraints. As-
sume that goods 1 and 2 are introduced in the market (i.e., x1 > 0 and x2 > 0) and denote their
characteristics vectors by (c∗11, g (c
∗
11)) and (c
∗
12, g (c
∗
12)). Then the following first-order conditions
must be satisfied
g (c∗11) + α
∗
1c
∗
11 + α
∗
2 = 0, (29)
g (c∗12) + α
∗
1c
∗
12 + α
∗
2 = 0, (30)
where (α∗1, α
∗
2) denote the solution to these two equations.
Under these conditions, will any other good j 6= 1, 2 be introduced? This depends on the
gain of increasing xj around xj = 0 given (α∗1, α
∗
2) determined by (29)-(30). Either we have
g (c1j) + α∗1c1j + α
∗
2 ≤ 0, ∀j 6= 1, 2, (31)
29The term "compensated" may not be entirely appropriate here, because this usually refers to a situation
where income is changed so as to keep utility constant. Here, we are instead changing the consumption vector by
a scale factor in order to keep utility constant.
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in which case only goods 1 and 2 are introduced, or we have
g (c1j) + α∗1c1j + α
∗
2 > 0, for some j 6= 1, 2,
in which case j is introduced. In the latter case, one possibility is that good j replaces good 1
or 2 (or both), so that at most two goods are introduced in the market. Alternatively, if good
j were to be introduced together with 1 and 2, a necessary condition for an optimum to exist is
that
g (c1j) + α∗1c1j + α
∗
2 = 0,
along with conditions (29)-(30). These three conditions imply
g (c1j) + α∗1c1j = g (c
∗
11) + α
∗
1c
∗
11 = g (c
∗
12) + α
∗
1c
∗
12,
which in turn implies that, for any ν, we have
g (c1j) + α∗1c1j = ν [g (c
∗
11) + α
∗
1c
∗
11] + (1− ν) [g (c∗12) + α∗1c∗12]
= [νg (c∗11) + (1− ν) g (c∗12)] + α∗1 [νc∗11 + (1− ν) c∗12] . (32)
Then consider ν∗ ≡ c
∗
12−c1j
c∗12−c∗11
, which implies c1j = ν∗c∗11 + (1− ν∗) c∗12. Then eq. (32) at ν = ν∗
implies that g (c1j) = ν∗g (c∗11) + (1− ν∗) g (c∗12). Hence, the third good (c1j , g (c1j)) is a linear
combination in characteristics space of the other two goods, (c∗11, g (c
∗
11)) and (c
∗
12, g (c
∗
12)). In
this case, one of the three goods is spanned by the other two in characteristics space, and can
therefore be eliminated without reducing characteristics. Thus, in any case, at most two goods
are suﬃcient to maximize characteristics possibilities.
Moreover, by ordering goods so that goods 1 and 2 are introduced in equilibrium, eqs (29)-
(30) yield
α∗1 =
g (c∗11)− g (c∗12)
c∗12 − c∗11
, (33)
α∗2 =
g (c∗12) c
∗
11 − g (c∗11) c∗12
c∗12 − c∗11
. (34)
Because no other good, j 6= 1, 2, is introduced, the inequality (31) is satisfied. By inserting
(33)-(34) into (31), we obtain eq. (22) in the lemma. ¤
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A.3 Proof of Proposition 4
Assume that, in the no-tax equilibrium, both goods 1 and 2 are in the market at c∗1 ≡ (c∗11, c∗21)
and c∗2 ≡ (c∗12, c∗22). The no-tax CPF is then a straight line from c∗1 to c∗2 with a slope (in
absolute value) equal to c
∗
22−c∗21
c∗11−c∗12
. Because goods 1 and 2 are optimal goods, the no-tax CPF is
tangent to the no-tax GPF, g (.), at points c∗1 and c
∗
2. That is, we have
g0 (c∗11) = g
0 (c∗12) =
c∗22 − c∗21
c∗11 − c∗12
.
Consider the tax system in Proposition 4 with t2 > t1 (if t2 < t1, the arguments are simply
reversed). The after-tax CPF associated with goods 1 and 2 is a straight line through c
∗
1
1+t1
and
c∗2
1+t2 with a slope (in absolute value) equal to
1+t1
1+t2
c∗22−c∗21
c∗11−
1+t1
1+t2
c∗12
, which is lower than the original slope
given t2 > t1. The after-tax GPF, gt (.), relates to the no-tax GPF, g (.), in the following way. If
good j at (c1j , c2j) is a point on g (.) and is subject to the tax rate tj ∈ (t1, t2), then
³
c1j
1+tj
, c2j1+tj
´
is a point on gt (.). This implies that
³
c1j
1+tj
, g(c1j)1+tj
´
is a point on gt (.), so that
g(c1j)
1+tj
= gt
³
c1j
1+tj
´
.
We then have g0 (c1j) = g0t
³
c1j
1+tj
´
.
For part (a) of the proposition, consider good 2 at c
∗
2
1+t2
=
³
c∗12
1+t2
, c
∗
22
1+t2
´
. As c∗2 is a point on
g (.), c
∗
2
1+t2 is a point on gt (.). The slope at this point is g
0
t
³
c∗12
1+t2
´
= g0 (c∗12). Using that the
no-tax CPF is tangent to g (.) at c∗2, we have
g0t
µ
c∗12
1 + t2
¶
= g0 (c∗12) =
c∗22 − c∗21
c∗11 − c∗12
>
1+t1
1+t2 c
∗
22 − c∗21
c∗11 − 1+t11+t2 c
∗
12
.
Hence, the after-tax GPF, gt (.), is steeper than the after-tax CPF associated with goods 1 and
2 at point c
∗
2
1+t2 . Because the GPF and CPF are not tangent at good 2 in the presence of a tax
system, this can no longer be an optimal good and will be eliminated. In particular, because
the after-tax GPF is steeper than the after-tax CPF at c
∗
2
1+t2 , replacing good 2 by a good that
provides more of characteristic 2 expands the characteristics possibility set. Hence, if any high-
tax good survives in equilibrium, it will contain more of the high-tax characteristic that the
original high-tax good.
For part (b), we consider good 1 at c
∗
1
1+t1 =
³
c∗11
1+t1 ,
c∗21
1+t1
´
. Assume first that c >
g(c∗11)
c∗11
, so that
good 1 is located in the interior of the low-tax region. Then we can make an argument exactly
like the one for good 2 to show that the after-tax GPF, gt (.), is steeper than the after-tax CPF
associated with goods 1 and 2 at point c
∗
1
1+t1 . Hence, there exists low-tax goods to the left of good
37
1 (i.e. with more of the high-tax characteristic) that can expand the characteristics possibility
set. If the consumer wants to consume a bundle to the left of good 1, this good will be replaced
by one or two new low-tax goods on its left. On the other hand, if c =
g(c∗11)
c∗11
, there are no
low-tax goods to the left of good 1, and the good will then survive. The proof of the rest of part
(b) is straightforward.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 5
To determine whether the government finds it optimal to allow for good 3, we have to consider
the gain of increasing x3 around x3 = 0, given that goods 1 and 2 are in the market at their
second-best optimal levels. Good 3 should be introduced if the gain of increasing x3 (evaluated
at x3 = 0) is positive, i.e. if
−ρ
∙
∂a
∂x3
+
∂a
∂x0
∂x0
∂x3
¸
− μ
∙
∂x0
∂x3
+ 1
¸
> 0. (35)
From the function x0 = x0 (u, x1 + c13x3, x2 + g (c13)x3), we have
∂x0
∂x3
=
∂x0
∂x1
c13 +
∂x0
∂x2
g (c13) ,
so that (35) can be written as
−ρ ∂a
∂x3
− μ−
µ
ρ
∂a
∂x0
+ μ
¶
∂x0
∂x1
c13 −
µ
ρ
∂a
∂x0
+ μ
¶
∂x0
∂x2
g (c13) > 0. (36)
This condition must be evaluated at a point where the production eﬃcient goods 1 and 2 are in
the market at their second-best optimal levels, which implies
−
µ
ρ
∂a
∂x0
+ μ
¶
∂x0
∂x1
= ρ
∂a
∂x1
+ μ, (37)
−
µ
ρ
∂a
∂x0
+ μ
¶
∂x0
∂x2
= ρ
∂a
∂x2
+ μ. (38)
Conditions (36)-(38) may then be combined to give
ρ
∂a
∂x1
c13 + ρ
∂a
∂x2
g (c13)− ρ
∂a
∂x3
− μ+ μc13 + μg (c13) > 0. (39)
The functional structure of the distance function a (u, x0, x1 + c13x3, x2 + g (c13)x3) implies the
following relationship between derivatives:
∂a
∂x3
=
∂a
∂x1
c13 +
∂a
∂x2
g (c13) ,
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which we insert into (39) to arrive at our final expression
g (c13) > 1− c13.
This requirement is precisely ruled out by condition (22) in Lemma 1 under the normaliza-
tions c∗1 ≡ (1, 0) and c∗2 ≡ (0, 1), which implies that a socially inferior good such as good 3 is
characterized by g (c13) ≤ 1− c13. ¤
A.5 Proof of Proposition 6
To determine whether the government finds it optimal to allow for socially ineﬃcient goods,
consider the gain of increasing xN+1 around xN+1 = 0. It is optimal to introduce good N + 1
only if the gain of increasing xN+1 is positive (when evaluated at xN+1 = 0), i.e.
−ρ
∙
∂a
∂xN+1
+
∂a
∂x0
∂x0
∂xN+1
¸
− μ
∙
∂x0
∂xN+1
+ 1
¸
> 0,
which can be written as
−ρ ∂a
∂xN+1
− μ− ∂x0
∂xN+1
∙
ρ
∂a
∂x0
+ μ
¸
> 0. (40)
As good N + 1 is a socially ineﬃcient good, the characteristics provided by a unit of this
good, cN+1 = (c1N+1, ..., cMN+1), can be achieved at a lower cost (under no-tax prices) by a
linear combination of socially eﬃcient goods 1, ...,N . Denote by x¯1, ..., x¯N , the non-negative
amounts of the socially eﬃcient goods required to yield the same characteristics as one unit of
N + 1. We then have
∂x0
∂xN+1
=
∂x0
∂x1
x¯1 + ...+
∂x0
∂xN
x¯N ,
which can be inserted into (40) in order to get
−ρ ∂a
∂xN+1
− μ− ∂x0
∂x1
∙
ρ
∂a
∂x0
+ μ
¸
x¯1 − ...−
∂x0
∂xN
∙
ρ
∂a
∂x0
+ μ
¸
x¯N > 0. (41)
This condition must be evaluated at a point where the socially eﬃcient goods 1, ..., N are in the
market at their second-best optimal levels (which may be zero), so that the potential welfare
gains from all those goods have been fully exploited. This implies
−∂x0
∂xi
∙
ρ
∂a
∂x0
+ μ
¸
≤ ρ ∂a
∂xi
+ μ, i = 1, ..., N. (42)
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Conditions (41) and (42) can be combined to give
−ρ ∂a
∂xN+1
− μ+
∙
ρ
∂a
∂x1
+ μ
¸
x¯1 + ...+
∙
ρ
∂a
∂xN
+ μ
¸
x¯N > 0,
where we use that x¯1, ..., x¯N are non-negative. We can rewrite this to
ρ
∂a
∂x1
x¯1 + ...+ ρ
∂a
∂xN
x¯N − ρ
∂a
∂xN+1
+ μx¯1 + ...+ μx¯N − μ > 0. (43)
Moreover, because one unit of good N+1 corresponds in characteristics to x¯1, ..., x¯N , we have
∂a
∂xN+1
=
∂a
∂x1
x¯1 + ...+
∂a
∂xN
x¯N ,
which we insert into (43) to arrive at our final expression
x¯1 + ...+ x¯N > 1.
Recall that, in the no-tax equilibrium, all consumer prices equal 1 and it therefore costs 1 to
obtain the characteristics of one unit of good N + 1. Alternatively, in the no-tax situation,
the above condition implies that it would cost x¯1 + ... + x¯N > 1 to obtain the exact same
characteristics by combining goods 1, ..., N . This contradicts that goods 1, ..., N are the socially
eﬃcient goods. ¤
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Figure 3: The Impact of Taxation and Line-Drawing
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on the Characteristics Possibility Frontier
